Give AI agents power without giving them unlimited authority.
Shield stops secret reads, dangerous tools, and out-of-bounds actions before they run — then proves what happened with signed evidence. Cursor is the fastest install path, not the product category.
Before an agent gets a consequential tool, the call is bounded, confirmable, stoppable, and provable.
What is the agent allowed to do?
What needs a second confirmation?
Can you stop it immediately?
Can you prove what happened?
Cursor allowlist is a menu. Promptfoo is evals. This page denies before the tool runs, then leaves a receipt.
Secret exfil · credential files
resources/read on .env
Need
Block reads of credential-bearing paths before bytes leave the repo.
Obstacle
IDE trust prompts train users to approve; allowlists rarely enumerate every secret path variant.
Gap
No DENY with policy name and signed receipt in the bridge output.
Under the hood: identity, authority, runtime enforcement, and verifiable evidence for AI agents. MCP is one transport. Secret protection is one killer use case.